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War dog of the week: The book

The battle of Khe Sanh was the iconic confrontation of the Vietnam War, an epic test of wills in which 6,000 U.S. Marines held off as many as  20,000 communist North Vietnamese Army troops over seventy-seven days of siege in early 1968. The showdown recalled the celebrated 1954 siege of Dien Bien Phu, in which Vietnamese communist forces surrounded and eventually overran an isolated French stronghold. But unlike the French at Dien Bien Phu, the Americans maintained their fragile air link to Khe Sanh, and the combat base and its main outposts withstood communist bombardments and attacks until a relief force broke the siege in April. Barely three months later, U.S. Marines blew up their fortifications at Khe Sanh and slipped away.

1. The siege of Khe Sanh didn't change the course of the war, but it yielded notable military developments. Among these was the widespread use of new electronic sensors, which were dropped into the jungle approaches to Khe Sanh and proved critical in the stronghold's defense. The Khe Sanh campaign also saw the first use of tanks against American forces by the North Vietnamese. But the most spectacular feat of arms at Khe Sanh was Operation Niagara, the massive campaign of artillery and air strikes aimed at destroying North Vietnamese siege forces before they could overrun Khe Sanh. U.S. B-52 bombers and strike aircraft pounded North Vietnamese troops with more than 100,000 tons of bombs during the siege, and friendly artillery batteries adding 158,000 shells to the effort-the biggest coordinated display of American air and artillery power during the Vietnam War.

2. President Lyndon Johnson and General William Westmoreland considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons to prevent an American defeat at Khe Sanh. In a series of remarkable cables and phone calls, Westmoreland informed Johnson that he didn't believe nuclear or chemical weapons would be needed, but he held out the possibility that these ultimate options might be required to halt a North Vietnamese surge across the DMZ toward Khe Sanh.

3. War hawks have pilloried LBJ for not doing everything in his power to win the war in Vietnam, but the beleaguered president rejected the counsel of some top military advisors to make a stand at Khe Sanh. Among the most vociferous advocates of a retreat was retired Joint Chiefs chairman Maxwell Taylor, and he lobbied Johnson vigorously in letters and conversations. Johnson carefully considered Taylor's advice, but ultimately backed Westmoreland's quest to inflict a decisive defeat on the North Vietnamese at Khe Sanh.

4. U.S. forces were better fed and supplied than their communist adversaries in most Vietnam confrontations, but not Khe Sanh in the early weeks. On the hill outposts at Khe Sanh, shortages of food and water became critical. The hungry, bearded American defenders of Hill 881 South and 861 took on the appearance of ragged castaways on a desert island. A bold operation known as the Super Gaggle ended the resupply crisis by blanketing North Vietnamese positions with massive firepower, tear gas and smoke screens while helicopters swooped down to drop supplies onto the hill outposts.

5. Khe Sanh was a military victory for the Americans who successfully defended the stronghold during the seventy-seven days of siege. But that perception was shattered in July 1968 with the abandonment of the base, and Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam. History's verdict of Khe Sanh as a U.S. defeat is more an indictment of General Westmoreland and his false claims that Khe Sanh was indispensable to the U.S. war effort, rather than a true accounting of the epic siege that seized the national spotlight from January-April 1968.

Gregg Jones is the author of  Last Stand at Khe Sanh: The U.S. Marines' Finest Hour in Vietnam, recently published by Da Capo Press. He has worked as a staff writer for the Los Angeles Times, Dallas Morning News and Atlanta Journal-Constitution. He is also the author of Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America's Imperial Dream and Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement.

By Thomas E. Ricks, ricks.foreignpolicy.com


Will Karachi Become the Next Waziristan?

On May 5, an American FBI agent named Joel Cox was arrested in the Pakistani megacity of Karachi. The charge? Attempting to board a flight to Islamabad with ammunition and knives in his carry-on baggage. The Pakistani media immediately drew comparisons between Cox's case and that of Raymond Davis -- the CIA spy jailed in 2011 after gunning down two Pakistanis in Lahore.

However, Cox's legal travails, unlike those of Davis, didn't last long. He was granted bail on May 8, and his case was dismissed on May 19. Cox's lawyer contended that his client was in Karachi on a "special mission"that allowed him to carry weapons -- and a judge concurred.
So what exactly was this "special mission"? According to U.S. officials andCox's legal team, he was simply providing training to local law enforcement.
If this is true, then Cox was in Pakistan for a very good reason.
Pakistan's cities are suffering from relentless, and in some cases unprecedented, levels of violence. In 2013, Karachi's terrorist violenceincreased by 90 percent. The city's 2,700 casualties from violence that year represented a new record. Meanwhile, some of the deadliest sectarian attacks in the country over the last year have occurred in Peshawar and Quetta. Furthermore, many Pakistani cities are convulsed by bloodshed stemming from ethnic conflict and organized crime. These alone are daunting challenges for law enforcement.
And yet with most international troops withdrawing from neighboring Afghanistan, the difficult job of Pakistani city police officers is bound to become even tougher. The drawdown is likely to deepen instability not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal belt, but also -- thanks to the dynamics of Pakistan's rapid urbanization -- in Pakistan's teeming cities.
Consider that Pakistan is urbanizing at an annual rate of 3 percent -- the fastest pace in South Asia. Karachi's population grew 80 percent between 2000 and 2010 -- the biggest increase of any city in the world. According to U.N. estimates, roughly a third of Pakistan's population is currently urban-based, yet in about 10 years, that figure is expected to be nearly 50 percent (using strictly density-based definitions of urban space, Pakistan is already 60 to 65 percent urban today).
This urbanization can be attributed to various factors, from a natural increase in the overall population (which is rising at a nearly 2 percent annual clip) to rural residents seeking better economic opportunities and fleeing natural disasters. However, as I explain in Pakistan's Runaway Urbanization, a new Wilson Center report, there are two other chief -- yet less acknowledged -- drivers: war and conflict. Simply put, regional unrest tends to trigger mass migrations to Pakistani cities.
This is a long-standing dynamic. Six to eight million Indian Muslims entered Pakistan at partition, with many settling in the urban areas of Sindh and Punjab provinces. Similar influxes occurred during wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Then, in the 1980s, amid the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan, several million Afghans flowed into western Pakistan, with many ending up in Quetta and Peshawar. Finally, more recently, military offensives in Pakistan's tribal areas have triggered an exodus of people to Peshawar, Quetta, and Karachi.
What sets these latest rural-to-urban refugee flows apart from earlier ones is that militants are increasingly migrating along with civilians. Hundreds -- maybe thousands -- have been converging on Karachi alone over the last few years. According to some estimates, 8,000 Pakistani Taliban (TTP) fighters were there by 2012. They use the city as a fundraising and recruitment center, and, increasingly, as a base for attacks.
Pakistan's urban spaces offer incoming TTP forces a welcome and enabling environment. Urban society is rapidly radicalizing -- thanks in part to a young and growing, yet largely conservative middle class, and to the hardline messages of wildly popular, urban-based, private television channels. Not surprisingly, militant organizations are extending their reach across Pakistani cities. Dawn, a Pakistani newspaper, reported in March that the TTP wields some form of influence over most ethnic Pashtun-populated parts of Karachi (several million of Karachi's 18 million people are Pashtuns). And according to the Wall Street Journal, the TTP "controls or dominates" nearly a third of the city altogether. Predictably, numerous extremist organizations -- including al Qaeda -- are actively recruiting from within Pakistan's urban middle class. In sum, militancy has become entrenched in Pakistani cities, and is no longer a strictly tribal-belt affair. 
And yet soon, this could all get much worse. Next year, Afghanistan's fate will be left in the hands of fragile Afghan security forces. They will face emboldened enemies in the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network, which continue to enjoy sanctuaries in North Waziristan. And if the statements of militant commanders and South Asian government officials are to be believed, these enemies will receive operational support from thePakistani Taliban, Punjab-based sectarian militants, and even Indian jihadists.
We now know that if Washington concludes a bilateral security agreement with Kabul, President Obama will leave nearly 10,000 troops in Afghanistan next year, before withdrawing them in 2016. While certainly helpful, this residual presence would ultimately amount to a modest, non-combat, temporary force lacking the capacity and mandate to stabilize Afghanistan in a major way. For all these reasons, we can expect Afghanistan's security situation to worsen after this year.
Given the large, porous Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, we can also expect that this increased unrest will spill into Pakistan and displace communities on both sides of the border. And based on past history, we can assume that many of these refugees will migrate to Pakistani cities.
Admittedly, Afghan refugees may have more trouble doing so this time around as the Pakistani government is implementing new measures to reduce Afghan migration into the country. New border screening rules are going into effect, and housing acquisition procedures are becoming stricter. Already, in Karachi, officials are tracking down illegal Afghan immigrants. And in Islamabad, bulldozers have dismantled Afghan settlements.
Whether these measures achieve their objective remains to be seen. Yet even if they do, we can still expect scores of tribal-area Pakistanis -- displaced by intensified cross-border attacks and other fighting that spills over the border -- to converge on cities. Many would be Pashtuns, and those ending up in Karachi could further aggravate the city's volatile ethnic mix, which has already spawned violent competition (much of it fought over precious land) between the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, a political party that is dominated by Mohajirs, and the Awami National Party, which is mainly made up of Pashtuns. 
Tribal area inhabitants could also pour into urban areas to escape from Pakistani military offensives, which are bound to pick up now that Islamabad's peace overtures to the TTP have ceased, and from vicious intra-TTP fighting -- which also stands to intensify given the organization's increasingly fractured state.
Meanwhile, militants, particularly those gunning for new targets as U.S. forces leave Afghanistan, could be preparing for future assaults on cities in Pakistan's populous eastern and southern regions. A recent Pakistani intelligence report claims that al Qaeda and the TTP are planning to use the Indus River to transfer arms and ammunition from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province to Sindh and Punjab. And the TTP is relocating large numbers of forces not only to Karachi, but also to southern Punjab -- a hotbed of sectarian and anti-India militancy.
As underscored in Pakistan's Runaway Urbanization, new arrivals in Pakistani cities will further tax the ability of municipal authorities to provide basic services and natural resources. Even now, some of Pakistan's urban poor can only access enough water to meet one-fifth of daily human drinking water requirements. City power shortages are incessant.Nearly 50 percent of city residents live in slums. Six percent of urban Pakistanis have no latrines, and 95 percent do not have their garbage collected. And masses of young urbanites -- in a country of 180 million, where two-thirds are under the age of 30 -- face a national labor market that creates less than 700,000 new jobs a year. The upshot? Pakistani cities could soon be awash with unemployed youth facing acute privation, a demographic primed for radicalization.
This all places a tremendous burden on Pakistani police forces, which have a checkered record. On the one hand, they boast efficient officers and fearless terrorist-hunting commanders such as the late Chaudhry Aslam, who was killed in a Karachi bomb attack in January. For this reason,Pakistani activists and international analysts alike have called for a more decentralized Pakistani policing model that gives officers more autonomy to do their jobs. Yet on the other hand, the police are undeniably corruptand given to idly standing by while the vulnerable citizens they are meant to protect -- from women and schoolgirls to religious minorities -- are mercilessly attacked.
According to Ahsan Iqbal, Pakistan's minister for planning, development, and reform, the government is addressing policing issues, including "smart policing," community policing, and citizen-police liaison committees. This is a start. Yet much more needs to done.
As for FBI agent Joel Cox and his "special mission" to train police? He was doing his small part to help Pakistani law enforcement prepare for a looming and formidable challenge -- one that promises to come into sharp focus next year. 
By Michael Kugelman, southasia.foreignpolicy.com


Broken Windows and Beating Back al Qaeda

The optimistic "Africa Rising" slogan has been looking a little tired of late, as its critics point out that higher growth rates do not necessarily deliver either jobs or poverty alleviation. There's been less focus on another area where the "Africa Rising" narrative also seems to be failing to deliver: improved security for the continent's 1.1 billion inhabitants.

The last year has seen a spate of high-profile, hugely embarrassing domestic-security lapses in two of sub-Saharan Africa's key economies, each regarded in the West as trusted partners and regional anchor states. The notion that the continent was growing increasingly capable of policing itself took a knock during the Westgate siege in Kenya last September, in which 67 people died. More recently, Nigeria's armed forces have been publicly humiliated by the failure to free more than 200 schoolgirls taken hostage by Boko Haram militants and a series of escalating attacks in that seizure's wake.
What's striking about both episodes, on opposite sides of the continent, is that they have involved national armies ordinarily regarded as amongst the continent's best. In the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Africans were determined to take responsibility for their own security by gradually phasing out reliance on armed interventions paid for and mounted by the West. Nigeria and Kenya are seen as crucial in that effort.
Nigeria, which recently supplanted South Africa as the continent's biggest economy, has long provided the muscle for regional interventions blessed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), serving in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its Joint Task Force (JTF) has contributed to international peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia and East Timor, and dispatched soldiers to Somalia, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali. Meanwhile, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), widely attributed with having held the country together after elections in 2007 exploded into ethnic factionalism, are viewed in Washington as a vital East African bulwark against al-Shabab infiltration from the north. The KDF currently has more than 3,000 men deployed in southern Somalia.
Yet both armies have botched key domestic interventions when crises hit, exposing weaknesses that raise fundamental question marks about operational reliability.
When Islamic terrorists attacked the Westgate shopping mall in central Nairobi last September, KDF troops actually shot members of the elite counter-intelligence paramilitary unit that had already secured the area; a row over jurisdiction suddenly took precedence over securing the area. The KDF then devoted much of the four-day siege that followed toshooting open shop owners' safes, emptying fridges of beer and looting designer outlets -- removing men's suits, jewelry, mobile phones, and frilly underwear as survivors cowered in toilets, waiting to be freed.
All this was done in the heart of Nairobi, just meters from where the world's media stood watching and waiting. If the KDF behaved like this at home, what, wondered many Kenyans, did it get up to when no prying eyes were around? A simultaneously draconian and sloppily executed roundup of thousands of Somalis suspected of living illicitly in Nairobi's Eastleigh district, ordered at the beginning of April by the government, has since probably done more to radicalize Kenya's Muslim community,human rights groups say, than al-Shabab ever achieved.
In Nigeria, a fortnight later, scores of parents of the kidnapped girls became so exasperated by army assurances that the situation was in hand, they resorted themselves to exploring the Sambisa forest where Boko Haram were believed to be hiding the children. Anti-government demonstrations in Abuja are getting angrier, Twitter campaigns and denunciations of the government and military elite ever more vocal -- but reports continue to stream in of soldiers either fleeing when Boko Haram fighters attack or failing to deploy in the first place.  
Experts say too that the JTF played a part in creating the current crisis. Back in 2009, when Boko Haram took far less radical a form, the army handed over its captured spiritual leader Mohammed Yusuf to police, whosummarily executed him. The JTF has since alienated the Muslim community of northeastern Nigeria with the indiscriminate detention of hundreds of locals.
And what do their failings signal for the African Union's long-touted ambition of using regional troops to stop genocide, hunt down jihadists, and neutralize pirates, among other things, while reducing Africa's reliance on the U.N. and the militaries of friendly former colonial powers?
The answers, unfortunately, offer little cause for optimism. 
Africa's relationship to its military could be defined as one of long-standing, uneasy intimacy. First-time Western visitors are often struck by two things: how much camouflage they see around them, and local inhabitants' knee-jerk response to men in uniform, who are viewed not as reassuring symbols of law and order but as potential predators.
Such attitudes stem from the post-independence era, when the military coup became a standard method for alternating executive power. The new nation states were weak, inexperienced political parties squabbling, and institutions embryonic. The African armies established by France, Britain, and Portugal, which the colonial powers had used as fodder during the two World Wars, easily came to dominate their societies, representing both possible threats and vested interests clamoring for attention.
"The West has this model of a disciplined, neutral army that stands on the sidelines,  independent of domestic politics," explains Jakkie Cilliers of the Pretoria-based Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS). "But the African model is of a military that is used internally and is part and parcel of domestic politics and resource allocation."
Presidents like Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, who himself staged two successful coups, warded off likely repeats by deliberately keeping national armies divided and faction-ridden. Mobutu was a great believer in building up and then running down competing elite forces, relying in a real crisis on Western paratroopers and white mercenaries to do his fighting for him.
Elsewhere on the continent, fragile, twitchy civilian governments often encouraged the generals they feared to become de facto businessmen, with foreign sorties seen as particularly lucrative forms of distraction. None of this encouraged discipline, nor was it healthy for rank-and-file morale.
During its intervention in Liberia in the 1990s, for instance, Nigeria's army became firmly associated with diamond smuggling and drug trafficking. After coming to the rescue of Laurent Kabila in 1998, Zimbabwe's generals became deeply embroiled in the Democratic Republic of Congo's diamond and gold mining.
These scenarios are dated now. Today, the AU does not look kindly on putschists, regional powers have turned concerted cold shoulders on juntas, and coup leaders swiftly learn to embrace the rhetoric of multiparty democracy. But many scars remain, explaining what can seem like baffling levels of confusion and incompetence in the continent's security forces.
says Knox Chitiyo, an associate fellow at Chatham House's Africa program.
Nigeria's history of military coups stretches back to 1966, two years after independence from Britain. It only ended in 1999 with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo. One of Obasanjo's first moves was to try and render the army coup-proof by retiring 400 senior officers deemed more interested in politics than military campaigns, bringing the armed forces back under civilian command.
That history renders the civilian government's reluctance to meet generals' demands for new kit -- the reason, many officers now claim, for its inability to bring Boko Haram to heel -- thoroughly comprehensible. "The army has been a massive factor in Nigeria," says Cilliers, "and if it's too well run and effective, there's the danger it becomes a big problem at home."
Some military experts argue that it's easy to underestimate the logistical challenges facing troops trying to locate the kidnapped girls. "The three states that Boko Haram has attacked most frequently cover a geographical area more than five times bigger than Switzerland," saysMax Siollun, a Nigerian military historian. "The Sambisa forest is also vast. It would be difficult for any army to track schoolgirls in a forest twice the size of Belgium."
Unnerved by the ruthlessness of the radicalism they are encountering, soldiers feel under siege. "It is likely that Boko Haram has been more adept at infiltrating the security forces than the other way around. There is frustration in some units that soldiers are being picked off by seemingly invisible Boko Haram fighters who have a suspiciously good knowledge of the military's movements," Siollun says.
Others dismiss these as excuses, placing the emphasis for the army's failures on decades of budgetary "leakage" in a country routinely ranked as one of the world's most venal. Even before the kidnapping placed Boko Haram on Michelle Obama's radar, the Nigerian media were recounting how unpaid allowances, miserly rations, and Spartan living conditions were undermining morale among soldiers -- who complained militants went into battle far better equipped than they.
At one barracks in Maiduguri, a flashpoint for Boko Haram attacks, soldiers mutinied twice in May alone, with recruits on one occasionopening fire on a major general's car.
Observers say soldiers manning road blocks often lack radios that would allow them to communicate with colleagues, and the JTF lack the capacity to air lift forces to conflict zones, dooming troops to days of travel to even reach Nigeria's northeast.
"We spend billions of pounds a year on the Nigerian army, but you have to bribe the armory to get a round for your AK47," Nigerian blogger Kayode Ogundamisi told an audience at London's Frontline club this week. "Corruption, let's be frank, is at the core of this issue."
In Kenya, by contrast, the armed forces have long been respected for their apolitical stance and operational efficiency. But analysts say that professionalism was slowly eaten away by a pattern of ethnic appointments under President Daniel arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin, and then his successor, President Mwai Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu. "After 2007, Kibaki made sure that every strategic post, all the top jobs, rested in Kikuyu hands," says a Nairobi-based security analyst who prefers to remain anonymous.
Giant procurement scandals such as the recent $1 billion Anglo Leasing scam, which involved 18 bloated military and security contracts signed off on by Kibaki's ministers, also bled the state treasury of funds while doing nothing to provide armed forces with the equipment required for modern warfare. "If you're going into action with junk equipment, and you know that your fat general is sitting at his desk having made a nice profit from buying that junk, well, that's not very motivating, now, is it?" says the security analyst. (Two of the firms involved in Anglo Leasing were recently paid off by the government after going to court, a bitter irony for Kenyans who feel security in key cities has never been worse.)
In an echo of previous African conflicts, the KDF today also stands accused by a U.N. monitoring group of becoming invested in charcoal trading in Somalia -- a business which, ironically, benefits the very al-Shabab militants the KDF is fighting.
Another issue that has surfaced is the state of Kenya's domestic police, corroded by decades of systemic sleaze and ethnic favoritism. A good police force is the interface between a state's security apparatus and the public, providing it with the data that allows effective grass roots monitoring of communities. But in Kenya, roadblocks are used primarily to extract bribes, not information.
One of the characteristics of the Westgate siege, some security experts say, was the absence of any prior intelligence indicating imminent attack. This was a sign not only that intelligence systems had failed, but that the country's network of immigration posts and police stations were functionally useless.
"You could make the case that Africa doesn't need militaries, it needs gendarmeries," says Cilliers. "But we've got into this pattern in which the army is called in automatically, because no one trusts the police."
For his part, Chatham House's Knox Chitiyo believes a more fundamental problem has recently been exposed: The changing nature of today's security challenges are catching off guard what, at heart, are old-fashioned former colonial armies, set up and trained on traditional lines. "These armies are good at handling either conventional warfare or counterinsurgency," Chitiyo says. "But now, you have a new dynamic, a nexus of domestic terrorism -- rural and urban -- coming together with counterinsurgency, and they are not equipped to deal with that new type of warfare."
Both Westgate and the school kidnapping, he argues, highlight the growing need for African special forces, boasting sophisticated skills in hostage negotiations and extraction. At the moment, these skills often come from abroad: Nigeria, for instance, accepted them after an international meeting hosted in Paris by President Francois Hollande. Anti-terror experts and specialists in hostage negotiation from France, Britain, and the United States are reported to be in Nigeria now, using aerial and other surveillance to try and locate the girls.
But such cooperation raises the risk of prolonging the continent's continuing dependency. "Are African governments going to have to rely on the West again, and for how long?" asks Chitiyo, warning of "delicate sovereignty issues."
The AU has plans for a 25,000-person African Standby Force, meant to fill the role of, variously, U.N. and American, French, and British forces. It will be based on existing national forces, and despite recent debacles at home, incompetence abroad by African troops is by no means assured. When airlifted to an African crisis zone by the U.N. and provided with Western salaries, decent kit, sophisticated intelligence backup, and clear lines of command, blue-helmeted African forces can dramatically raise their games. Uganda's generals, for example, have been accused of needlessly prolonging the war on the Lord's Resistance Army in the north of their own country, the better to pocket ghost salaries, run hotels, and engage in the timber trade. But the army's performance in Somalia as part of the AU mission in Somalia has been exemplary.
Still, the Nigerian and Kenyan episodes clearly do not bode well for AU strategists. (The launch of the standby force has been delayed to 2015 after repeated reschedulings.) "If you have problems associated with underfunding, low morale, and corruption in a national force, it washes across everything else," Cilliers says. "Anyone thinking of pulling together a peacekeeping operation in Africa should be seriously concerned about what's happened in these two countries."
By Michela Wrong, www.foreignpolicy.com

The politics of intellect


 

Intellectuals are defined as "idea workers" that exercise profound influence on policy makers and public opinion, but are often not directly accountable for the results.
Democracy has produced a class of professional politicians who are ambitious and want to attain political power by using all sorts of methods including propaganda, lobbying and the cynical use of slogans which appeal to the masses. They take care to not openly violate the sensibilities of the people, compromise with the prevailing situation and never try to play a revolutionary or radical role. Even those politicians who are secular and liberal in their private life, champion the cause of religious extremism in order to win the support of the people. They are more concerned with gaining the sympathy and support of the voters to win elections than anything else.

On the contrary, intellectuals are not eager to be popular; they analyse and dissect the problems of society independently, irrespective of whether the people like them or not. Their main objective is to liberate the society from stagnation and come up with new ideas which could guide the society to a better future. Whenever there is a conflict between politicians and intellectuals the former always appeal to the emotions of the people, while the latter approach the problems rationally.

During the Age of Enlightenment, intellectuals were not opposed by politicians but were resisted by the rulers who were afraid of their ideas. These intellectuals, by propagating their radical ideas, changed the whole structure of society. In France, the philosophers widely published books and pamphlets on social, political and economic issues. They resisted against political absolutism, religious sectarianism and domination of aristocracy. The ideas of these intellectuals were put into practice after the French Revolution, which transformed not only the French but the whole European society.

This was a great success on the part of intellectuals against the ruling classes of Europe.

However, the active role of intellectuals decreased after the First World War when democracy replaced absolute kingship in most of the European countries. Especially in Germany, the defeat in the war provided more space to politicians than intellectuals. When the Nazi party gradually became popular and won the elections, the voice of the German intellectuals was subdued and lost in the emotionalslogans of the party. Instead of fighting against the regime, prominent writers, philosophers and scientists left Germany and sought refuge in other countries. The philosophers of the Frankfurt School, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Hockheimer and Erich Fromm first went to Switzerland and finally to the US. Bertolt Brecht and other writers also left for safety. As a result, the German intellectual life became unproductive. Those who stayed behind compromised with the Nazi ideology and lost their credibility. However, the failure of intellectuals and the victory of politicians led Germany to the Second World War; the defeat wherein broughtdisaster to the country and nation.

In the case of`India, intellectuals played a very positive role against colonialism and, after independence, carned respect because of`their enlightened ideas and thoughts in society. When the question of Babri mosque/Ram Janam Bhomi arose, the leading historians of India rejected the claim of Hindu extremists on the existence of the Ram Janam Bhomi.

However, the sane and academie voice, which was based on historical evidence, was ignored when politicians mobilised the religious emotions of the people which led to the demolition of the mosque. It was a great shock to the intellectualswho failed to convince the people to act reasonably and tolerate the religious sensibilities of other faiths.

When LK. Advani started his Rath Yatra by exploiting Hindu religious symbols, he created wider sympathy and popularity for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which consequently won the elections and governed India despite the opposition of progressive and liberal intellectuals.

The Indian intellectuals are trying to prevent communal riots by investigating, analysing and discussing their causes and consequences on society. When communal riots broke out in Gujrat, Modi was its chief minister. The Muslims, being the victim, were slaughtered, burnt alive and their property was looted. It was one of the worst communal riots after independence which shook Indian society to its core.

Writers, journalists and political activists documented it after collecting evidence and proved that the riots were state sponsored and Modi was responsible for the carnage. The exposure had worldwide impact and Modi was denied visa for most of the European countries and the US. In the end, all efforts by Indian intellectuals failed to prevent extremism.

Yet by appealing to the religious emotions of the people, Modi won the recent elections. His victory absolved him of all crimes and atrocities and he is now acceptable to all those countries that banned his entry.

In Pakistan, in the absence of an effective intellectual class, politicians are free to use religious symbols and slogans to win popularity. There is no tool to check the growing influence of religious extremism and corruption. Generally, the Pakistani intellectuals are playing a subdued role and have failed to present any alternative model of political system.

The question is: why the intellectuals fail to counter politicians, whose emotional policies generally lead to disaster? It is sometimes argued that illiterate people are attracted by emotions while literate societics defy emotionalism and choose rational policies for their countries. However, this argument is not fully satisfactory. The German society, which was highly educated, fully supported Hitler and his Nazi party. The recent imperial policies of the US are also supported by the American people except for a tiny minority whose voice is not heard. History teaches us a lesson that those societies which neglected the ideas of intellectuals are doomed to disaster. 
By Mubarak Ali
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  • Thomas Sowell on Intellectuals and Society - YouTube

    www.youtube.com/watch?v=ERj3QeGw9Ok
    Dec 17, 2009 - Uploaded by HooverInstitution
    In his newest work, Intellectuals and Society, he will di. ... the economy in light of the comments Sowell was making aboutintellectual ineptness.
  • Thomas Sowell on the second edition of Intellectuals and ...

    www.youtube.com/watch?v=JyufeHJlodE
    May 8, 2012 - Uploaded by HooverInstitution
    ... of the publication of a new edition of his book Intellectuals andSociety, ... Thomas Sowell 

  • India and Pakistan: A Thin Line Between War and Peace

    An early dividend of Narendra Modi’s election as India’s prime minister appeared on May 26, when Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited New Delhi for the inauguration. In his winning election campaign last year, Sharif had declared, “If India takes one step for good relations, Pakistan will take two. We even want to put an end to visa requirements between the two countries...We want peace with India.” Now the two South Asian leaders are mutually pledged to resume a peace process that Sharif and then-Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had begun in 1999.

    However, the hoped-for peace process could turn to war—with huge implications for the United States—if militant actors in Pakistan attack India in hopes of provoking Modi to overreact. Something like this happened in 1999. Then, Pervez Musharraf and several colleagues in the Pakistan Army launched a clandestine incursion into the Kargil region of Kashmir, which triggered a limited, hard-fought war that India won, with diplomatic assistance from Bill Clinton. Today, the likely instigators would be the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups who wish to divert the Pakistani state from cracking down on them.
    Many Pakistanis loathe Modi as a belligerent anti-Muslim Hindu fundamentalist. What distinguishes the militants from other Pakistanis is an interest in provoking Modi into military action that would unite Pakistanis in a war against India instead of against the militants themselves. Given Modi’s reputation and self-image as a strongman, it is difficult to imagine he would not respond forcefully to violence emanating from Pakistan. As one of his top advisors put it recently, “Modi will have to respond to an attack or he will lose all his credibility.”
    During the last major crisis following the November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba militants, India’s leaders responded only with minimal political sanctions. This restraint was perhaps wise policy, as world and domestic opinion in Pakistan turned against the terrorists and their sponsors. But the lack of a cathartic military response left many Indians, including some senior figures in the armed forces, frustrated that the Pakistan Army did not suffer enough for harboring (if not authorizing) the terrorists.
    These circumstances make it extremely difficult to see how another major terrorist attack on India would not escalate to war. And, if Modi did respond militarily, Pakistan Army leaders would feel that allowing him to “win” would reinforce the dangerous notion that Hindu belligerence pays, and that the already beleaguered Pakistan Army does not deserve the power and privileges it has long enjoyed. Humiliation would leave the Pakistani Army unable to claim the capability and authority to protect the country against its challengers abroad or at home. Facing such a prospect, the Army would feel hard-pressed to use every quiver in its arsenal, including its nuclear weapons.
    Fortunately, Modi and Sharif, along with their electorates, understand that both countries would be much better off if they could expand mutual trade and other forms of peaceful interaction. Both societies and governments recognize that the perpetrators of violence and perpetual conflict are a small minority that threatens the internal well-being of each country as well as security and prosperity between them.
    Thus, the challenge for Indians and Pakistanis—and for the U.S. government, which inevitably would be impelled to mediate a new conflict—is to take steps now to prevent major terrorist attacks on India and to prepare modalities to manage consequences if prevention fails.
    The United States needs to be more forthcoming than it has been in the past in sharing intelligence with India on possible threats and holding Pakistan to account for its ambivalent counterterrorism performance concerning India. Indian leaders need to correct longstanding inadequacies in their intelligence and counterterrorism organizations, and prepare contingencies for responding to attacks that take full account of the risks of escalation. Pakistani leaders, especially in the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence, need to open genuine lines of communication with their Indian counterparts and demonstrate that they are doing everything they can to prevent future Mumbai-like attacks.
    Cooperation like this must occur before an attack if there will be any chance of mitigating risks of escalation after one occurs. The stakes could not be higher. The United States cannot publicly orchestrate such cooperation, but it can (and should) work behind the scenes at high levels to facilitate it.
    By George Perkovich VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDIES
    More from this author...
    http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/india-and-pakistan-thin-line-between-war-and-peace/hch6


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    From 14 April 2014 the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database includes newly released information on military expenditure in 2013. This Fact Sheet describes the global, regional and national trends in military expenditure that are revealed by the new data.